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November 13, 2007 I Introduction
The fraction of household headed by single women with dependent children has increased rapidly
in many countries in the recent decades. The UK is no exception in this case. At the same
time, the employment rate of lone mothers fell substantially relative to that of married mothers
between the late 1970s and the mid 1990s (Gregg and Harkness, 2003). The combination of
these trends contributed to a steady rise in the poverty rate among children.
As a result of such concerns, several countries have initiated or expanded a range of policies
aimed at supporting working families on low income. An important forerunner in this context
was the US Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC). Up until the mid-1980s the EITC had been a
relatively small programme. However, through a sequence of expansions the EITC has emerged
as one of the main welfare programmes oﬀering support to low-income families (Hotz and Scholz,
2003). The EITC is fundamentally diﬀerent from more traditional welfare programmes in that
it only oﬀers beneﬁts to households with at least one working adult. The design of the EITC
is such that it is considered by many as promoting both “family and work”. As such it can be
viewed as a key part of a wider strategy to combat poverty by encouraging labour supply as
well as the formation of two-parent households.
The UK has long had a policy of in-work beneﬁts but like the EITC the UK family tax credits
were for a long time overshadowed by more traditional welfare programmes like Income Support
(IS). In October 1999 the existing Family Credit (FC) programme was, however, replaced by
the considerably more generous Working Families’ Tax Credits (WFTC).1 The WFTC became
one the Labour government’s ﬂagship policies for combating poverty among children. Indeed,
the WFTC was subsequently reformed again in April 2003 and relaunched under the name
Working Tax Credit (WTC); at the same time the child premia that had been available under
IS and WFTC were collected under a single programme known as Child Tax Credit (CTC).
While being logically separate programs, the WTC and CTC are nevertheless interrelated e.g.
by being subject to a single means-test. A novel feature of the WTC programme was that it
expanded the set of potential recipients to also include, for the ﬁrst time, childless individuals
and couples. While there has been a number of studies of the labour supply eﬀects of the WFTC
reform in particular, little is known about the tax credits’ impact on family structure.2
1See Blundell (2002) for a survey and discussion of both the WFTC and other “Welfare-to-Work” policies.
2Contributions that evaluate and discuss the labour supply eﬀects of the WFTC reform include Blundell et
al. (2000), Brewer et al. (2007), Blundell and Hoynes (2004), Gregg and Harkness (2003), Francesconi and van
2Indeed, the potential impact of welfare programmes on family structure is a highly con-
tentious issue. A substantial US literature examines whether more generous welfare programs
are associated with higher rates of female household headship. Much of this literature has ex-
ploited variation across US states to identify the eﬀect of welfare. While the early literature
found statistically signiﬁcant eﬀects the more recent literature has highlighted the fragility of
these results. Moﬃtt (1994) showed that the estimates of the eﬀect of welfare beneﬁts on fe-
male headship are highly sensitive to the inclusion of state-ﬁxed eﬀects. Hoynes (1997) took
one further step by adding individual-ﬁxed eﬀects; she shows that welfare beneﬁts are positively
correlated with both individual and state eﬀects, casting serious doubt on the results from the
early literature: when both individual and state eﬀects are included there is no longer any
statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect of welfare.3 A few recent studies have looked more particularly at
the potential eﬀect of the EITC. Eissa and Hoynes (2003) exploit a number of policy changes,
including the EITC expansion, to identify the eﬀect of taxes and transfers on marital status.4
They ﬁnd that taxes and transfers do aﬀect marriage behavior, but that the responses are quite
modest (see below).5
In contrast there is very little work available on the eﬀect of welfare beneﬁts on partnership
status in the UK context. Two recent exceptions are Francesconi and van der Klaauw (2007)
and Walker and Zhu (2006). The ﬁrst paper looks at the eﬀect of the 1999 WFTC reform on a
variety of outcomes, including the rate of entry into partnerships. The authors use an extended
diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence approach; identiﬁcation of the eﬀect of the reform is achieved by the fact
that WFTC eligibility requires the presence of at least one child in the household. By eﬀectively
contrasting the rate of entry into partnership for single mothers to that of single women without
children they conclude that the WFTC reform has had a small but signiﬁcant negative eﬀect on
der Klaauw (2007).
3Moﬃtt (1992) surveys the literature up to the early 1990s. Subsequent surveys are provided by Moﬃtt
(1998). See also Hoynes (1997). Rosenzweig (1999) argues that models that identify the eﬀect of policy through
year-to-year variation are likely to underestimate the policy eﬀects; he suggest using a cohort-based approach,
where a woman’s partnership status in early adulthood is linked to the average beneﬁts to which she was exposed
during her teenage years. Using this approach, Rosenzweig ﬁnds larger policy responses than e.g. Moﬃtt (1994)
and Hoynes (1997).
4See also Dickert-Conlin and Houser (1999) and Ellwood (2000).
5T h e r ei sa l s oa ne m e r g i n gl i t e r a t u r et h a tl o o k sa tt h ee ﬀect of the 1996 US welfare reform on family structure.
See e.g. Schoeni and Blank (2000) and Bitler et al. (2004). Moreover, there is an emerging literature that considers
the impact of the EITC on fertility (Baughman and Dickert-Conlin, 2003).
3the rate of entry into partnerships for single mothers. The second paper ﬁnds that child support
liabilities and entitlements have a sizeable impact on separation probabilities. The authors also
point out that expected child support net payments do not always equal expected receipt due
to the beneﬁt system. Hence Walker and Zhu identify an indirect channel through which the
beneﬁt system aﬀects partnership dissolution.
The empirical strategy followed in the current paper is very diﬀerent from these last two
papers and follows more closely Eissa and Hoynes (2003). I examine the eﬀect of the family
Tax Credits (by which I mean FC, WFTC, and WTC/CTC) and the IS programme on the
propensity to have a partner. I estimate a simple model where the probability of having a
partner depends on individual characteristics, region of residence, year and, importantly, the
beneﬁt consequences of having a partner. The beneﬁt consequences of having a partner are
modelled for each individual. I use data that covers the years 1995 to 2004 and the eﬀect of
policy is identiﬁed due to the fact that both the tax credits and IS were reformed during this
time period.
While the basic empirical strategy is the same as in Eissa and Hoynes (2003), there are also
key diﬀerences both in focus and implementation. In contrast to Eissa and Hoynes who focus
on marriage as outcome I consider whether or not a woman has a partner (either married or
cohabiting).6 Also, I focus exclusively on welfare beneﬁts, not income taxes. This is simply
because the UK tax system is individually-based and hence generates negligible incentive for or
against partnership formation. A key diﬀerence in implementation is that I allow female labour
supplies to be partnership-state-dependent. That is, I allow for the possibility that some women
would change their labour force participation status if their partnership status were to change.
Another diﬀerence in implementation is that I allow for non-linearities in the assignment of
partner characteristics (and labour supplies) to the women in the data by adopting a ﬂexible
matching approach.
The rest of the paper is outlined as follows. Section II outlines the two beneﬁt programmes
considered — the tax credits and IS — and provides examples of how these programmes can
provide ﬁnancial incentives either for or against partnership formation. Section III discusses
the data used and provides a brief descriptive analysis of the distribution of partnership bonuses
and penalties facing the women in the data. Section IV outlines the empirical framework and
how it is implemented while Section V presents the regression results. Section VI then takes a
6Eissa and Hoynes (2000) focus on the choice between cohabitation and marriage.
4closer look at the likely impact of the WFTC and the WTC/CTC reforms on partnership rates
using the results obtained. Finally, Section VII concludes.
II The Beneﬁt System and Stylized Examples
The current analysis will focus on two main beneﬁt programmes: the (family) tax credits (FC,
WFTC and WTC/CTC) and Income Support (IS). Both programmes are aimed at low-income
households. The two programmes also connect naturally: while the tax credits are an “in-work
beneﬁt” programme in that eligibility requires that some adult in the household works at least
16 hours per week, IS is only available to individuals who work less than 16 hours. This section
brieﬂy describes the two beneﬁt programmes and how they can generate partnership bonuses
and penalties.7
The Tax Credits
The current analysis will span three generations of the UK family tax credit programme: FC
which was in operation between 1988 and 1999, WFTC which replaced FC in October 1999,
and WTC/CTC which replaced WFTC (and parts of IS) in 2003-2004.
The WFTC and FC shared the same structure, providing in-work support to low-paid
working adults and couples with dependent children. A household would be eligible for tax
c r e d i t sp r o v i d e dt h a ts o m ea d u l tw o r k e d1 6o rm o r eh o u r sp e rw e e ka n dt h e r ew a sa tl e a s to n e
dependent child. A household’s maximum weekly credit was made up of a basic adult element,
credits for each child, childcare credits (if applicable) and a bonus for working for 30 hours
or more per week. The 1999 WFTC reform was largely a set of changes in the programme’s
parameter values, increasing its generosity. First, the income threshold above which the beneﬁt
was tapered away grew. Second, the beneﬁt withdrawal (or “taper”) rate was reduced. Third,
the credits for younger children grew; this last change eﬀectively eliminated the variation in
7Beneﬁts not considered in the analysis include Housing Beneﬁt( H B )a n dt h eC o u n c i lT a xB e n e ﬁt (CTB). HB
is available to people with low incomes who are liable to pay rent on their property. The maximum level of HB is
the ‘eligible rent’. Similarly, CTB is available to people with low incomes who are liable to pay council tax. HB
and CTB are closely tied to IS in that people on IS (or income-based Jobseeker’s Allowance) are automatically
entitled to the full levels of HB and CTB. We choose not to model HB and CTB since it would require making
detailed assumptions about the accommodation choices in the counterfactual partnership state.
5credits by age that existed under the FC programme.8,9
In 2003 the WTC and the CTC were introduced. For families with children, the WTC would
broadly replicate the in-work support for adults provided through the WFTC programme.
However, a novel feature of WTC was that Tax Credits would now also be available to low
income working individuals and couples without children (aged 25 or above, working at least
30 hours/week). The WTC is made up of a basic element, a couple’s/lone parent element,
an additional 30 hour element and a childcare cost element (if applicable). The new CTC
programme, on the other hand, separated out the child premia previously provided under WFTC
and merged them with the child premia provided under the IS programme (see below). The idea
was that the CTC would create a single, seamless system of support for families with children,
payable irrespective of the household’s work status. The CTC consists of a basic family element,
premia for children (and an extra baby-element). After the WTC/CTC reform all child related
premia would be obtained through the CTC and not through WTC and IS. However, during a
transition period lasting one year, IS recipients continued to receive the child premia through
IS rather than through CTC.
There is a threshold income below which the credit is payable in full; at incomes above the
threshold the beneﬁt is tapered oﬀ at a ﬁxed rate. Indeed, WTC and the CTC, while logically
separate programmes, are nevertheless interrelated in that the two programmes are subject to
a joint means-test. In the following I will hence treat WTC and CTC as a single programme.
Income Support
Income support (IS) is a beneﬁt provided to people on low incomes. IS is mainly claimed
by lone parents, people who are incapable of work, and carers.10 Recipients of IS cannot be
working more than 16 hours per week. The calculation of IS entitlement is based on the notion
8Two further changes that came with the reform implies increased generosity. Any child maintenance received
became fully disregarded (while only a small amount was disregarded under FC). Also, the generosity with respect
to eligible childcare costs increased.
9In April 2001 a small program called the Children’s Tax Credit was introduced; this program provided extra
income tax relief worth up to £10/week to families with children. It was a forerunner to the “family element” in
the CTC system introduced in 2003. For completeness, the Children’s Tax Credit is included here in the WFTC
for the years 2001 and 2002.
10Households with an unemployed adult can claim Job-Seekers Allowance which can be either “contribution-
based” or “income-based”. The income-based JSA is very similar to IS.
6of a personal allowance which depends on age and household composition. To be eligible the
claimant’s income must be less than their basic personal allowance (plus any premiums and
some housing costs). The level of IS payable is the amount needed to top up their income to
the relevant amount.
Two major changes in the IS programme obtained during the period that is being studied
here. First, between 1998 and 2001 there were a sequence of increases in the premia for children;
these implied that the variation in premia by age that used to exist in the IS programme (just
like in FC) was gradually removed. Second, when the CTC was introduced, the child premia
were, as noted above, taken out of IS and were instead consolidated with the child premia
provided through the Tax Credits. However, this migration of IS recipients over to the CTC
was only completed in 2004.
Examples of Partnership Bonuses and Penalties
In the subsequent analysis a couple is said to face a welfare beneﬁt “partnership bonus” (alt.
“penalty”) if they are entitled to more beneﬁts as a couple than as singles. (See Section III for
af o r m a ld e ﬁnition.) In order to illustrate how partnership bonuses and penalties come about
it is useful to construct some hypothetical families.
Consider ﬁrst the Tax Credits. Whether a couple will face a Tax Credit partnership bonus
or penalty will depend crucially on individual labour supplies and on family income. I construct
four families that diﬀer in terms of the woman’s labour force participation and in the wage.
Family 1: “Low wage family with an inactive female”. Consider a family, with two children aged
5-10, where the male works full time (40 hours/week) at the £3.60/hr (the national minimum
wage at the beginning of 2000) and where the woman is inactive. The family pays £25 per week
and child for childcare.11
Family 2: “Low wage family with an active female”. Same as family 1 only the woman also
works full time at the minimum wage.
Family 3: “High wage family with an inactive female”. Same as family 1 except that the male
earns twice the minimum wage per hours, i.e. £7.20/hour.
11We also assume that the couple has no savings, no mortgage interest payments, and that there are no
maintenance payments after separation.
7Family 4: “High wage family with an active female”. Same as family 3 only the woman also
works full time at twice the minimum wage.
Figure 1 illustrates the Tax Credit partnership bonus (penalty if negative) of each family
under each year’s (April) policy from 1995 to 2004. The top left panel illustrates family 1 and
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Figure 1: Tax credit and IS net partnership bonuses for some stylized families (in 2000 prices).
See text for details.
Family 1 will be the family that faces the largest partnership bonus. Under FC and WFTC,
neither the male nor the female would qualify for Tax Credits when living separately; however,
as a couple they would. Moreover, the WFTC reform signiﬁcantly increased the beneﬁts they
would qualify for. Under WTC/CTC this family would still obtain a Tax Credit partnership
bonus. Note however that he could qualify for WTC as single and she would (in 2004) obtain
CTC (but not WTC) as single. The partnership bonus would therefore now only consist of the
WTC couple’s/family element. Family 2, in contrast, would face a partnership penalty since
8the woman would qualify for Tax Credits as single parent. As a couple they do not, due to
the means-test, get the full credit. After the WFTC reform, both the amount that the woman
w o u l db ee n t i t l e dt oo nh e ro w na n dt h ea m o u n tt hat they are entitled to as a couple increases
by roughly the same amount, leaving the partnership penalty more or less unaﬀected. Similarly,
the WTC/CTC reform had little impact on the implied partnership penalty.
Family 3 is similar to family 1, only that under FC the male’s income was too high for
the couple to qualify for any Tax Credits. With the more generous WFTC policy they would
qualify for some Tax Credits as couple and hence face a partnership bonus. This Tax Credit
partnership bonus disappeared, however, with the WTC/CTC reform. Family 4 is similar to
family 2 except, as a couple their joint income is high enough that they would not qualify for
any Tax Credits under any of the three versions of the programme. The female on her own
would qualify for some Tax Credits leading to a partnership penalty; moreover, the penalty
increased following the WFTC reform and was maintained by the WTC/CTC reform.
For the purposes of the empirical analysis what is interesting to note is how the WFTC
and WTC/CTC reforms will facilitate identiﬁcation. In particular, Figure 1 highlights how
the eﬀects of the reforms, especially the WFTC reform, on the net partnership bonus vary
substantially across family types, indeed in some cases in directly opposite directions. The
fact that the 1999 reform aﬀected the partnership incentives in opposite directions for diﬀerent
subgroups of the population implies that a standard diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence approach aiming
to uncover the average treatment eﬀect on women with children using as only information the
timing of the reform may have low power; in short, there may be substantial responses that
“average out”. The current paper therefore adopts a more detailed empirical strategy where
the policy-generated partnership incentives are explicitly modeled at the individual level. This
allows the model to identify the eﬀect of policy using information about how the reform(s)
aﬀected the partnership incentives in diﬀerent subgroups of the population and linking that to
the evolution of the group-speciﬁc partnership rates.
Consider next IS. Focusing on couples where the male works full time, IS will only generate
partnership penalties. Indeed, it will do so for couples where the female is not working and
hence will, when living alone, generally qualify for IS. Moreover, since the IS penalty is simply
the IS that the female can obtain on her own, neither the male’s income nor the female’s wage
matter for the size of the penalty. The size of the penalty does on the other hand depend
crucially on the number and ages of children. The right hand side of Figure 1 shows the IS
9partnership penalty for an inactive woman (above 25 years of age) who has zero, one or two
children under the age of 11. The partnership penalty has been stable for the childless woman,
but increased substantially for mothers during the years following 1999. This increase obtained
from the gradual increase in the generosity of the IS child premia. When the CTC was fully
implemented the child premia were removed from IS implying that the IS partnership penalty
no longer varied with the number of children.
Another thing to note is that the Tax Credits- and the IS-partnership net bonuses tend to
be strongly negatively correlated. Consider again the four families used above. The two families
that face Tax Credit bonuses, i.e. family 1 and 3, will also face (even larger) IS partnership
penalties. Conversely, the two families that face Tax Credit partnership penalties, i.e. family 2
and 4, face no IS penalties since the female is also working.
III Descriptive Analysis
Data and Summary Statistics
I use data from the Family Resources Survey (FRS) 1995-2004. The FRS has the advantage
of large samples and the years used contain three important changes in the welfare system: (i)
the replacement of FC with WFTC, (ii) the expansion of the IS child premia after 1999, and
(ii) the replacement of WFTC (and parts of IS) with WTC/CTC.
The focus of the analysis is on the partnership status of the women in the sample. The sample
includes all individuals between the ages of 20 and 55. Pooling across year and excluding retired,
long-term sick/disabled, students, self-employed and individuals with incomplete information
leaves 117,015 women, 81,554 of whom have partners, and 35,461 who are single.
Table 1 provides summary statistics for the sample of partnered and single women respec-
tively. It shows that the women with partners left school at, on average, the same time as the
women without partners. The women with partners are on average nearly four years older than
the women without partners. The women with partners also have more children (in all age
groups). Partnered and single women have about the same labour force participation rate.12
Single women earn slightly more and more often live in a metropolitan area. The earnings of
the predicted partners (see below) are slightly higher for the women with partners than for the
12Single mothers work less frequently than mothers with partners; single non-parents on the other hand work
more frequently than partnered non-parents.
10single women.
At times it will be convenient to consider women with diﬀerent levels of education; hence
label as “low educated” those women who left full-time education at age 16 or younger, as
“medium educated” those women who left full-time education at age 17-19, and as “high edu-
cated” those women who left full-time education at age 20 or later.
The Empirical Distribution of Net Partnership Bonuses
The (net) beneﬁt partnership bonus is deﬁned as the diﬀerence between the value of the beneﬁt
to which a couple are entitled to when they live together and the sum of the beneﬁts they are
entitled to when living apart. Formally consider a couple i.L e t Bc
i be the beneﬁtt ow h i c h
the couple are entitled when together and let B
f
i and Bm
i be the beneﬁt that the woman and
the man are entitled to, respectively, when living separately. The net “partnership bonus” for










(A negative ∆Bi will be referred to as a “partnership penalty”.)
In this section I provide some initial descriptive statistics on the distribution of beneﬁtp a r t -
nership bonuses and penalties for the existing couples in the FRS data. In order to compute
partnership bonuses/penalties facing each existing couple I need to calculate not only the ben-
eﬁts that the couple are actually entitled to, but also the beneﬁts they would be entitled to if
they were to separate. In simulating these the beneﬁt consequences of the separations I assume
that all children reside with the women, that existing savings are divided equally between the
partners and that there are no maintenance payments. I also have to make assumptions about
what happens to labour supplies and earnings. For the purpose of this descriptive analysis I




i at the observed labour supplies and earnings.
The results are illustrated in Figure 2. The top half shows the results for the Tax Credits.
The left hand panel shows the fraction of couples facing partnership bonuses/penalties respec-
tively while the right hand panel shows the average bonus (alt. penalty) among those subsidized
(alt. penalized) as well as the overall average net bonus. The ﬁgure shows that partnership
penalties are more frequent than bonuses; the fraction of couples penalized also increased sub-
stantially with the WTC/CTC reform. While the 1999 WFTC reform had at most a small
impact on the fraction of couples subsidized and penalized, it had a larger eﬀect on the average
11values. In particular, the right hand panel shows that the 1999 reform substantially increased
the average partnership bonus among subsidized couples. Looking at the overall net tax credit
partnership bonus, we see that the 1999 reform generated an increase of little less than £5/week.
The WTC/CTC reform went in the opposite direction, partly as a consequence of making tax
credits available to single individuals and partly due to the reallocation of the IS child premia
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Figure 2: The distribution of Tax Credit and IS partnership bonuses and penalties among
existing FRS couples (2000 prices).
The fraction of couples facing IS partnership penalties is somewhere between 35-45 percent
and has been decreasing over time (due to increasing female labour force participation). The
average penalty (among the penalized couples) increased from around £55 per week at the
beginning of the period to about £70 per week in 2002; this reﬂects the gradual increase in the
child premia from 1999 onwards. A major change came when the IS child premia were moved
over to the CTC programme; this reduced IS partnership penalty sharply. This change mirrors
the corresponding change in the Tax Credit system.
12Partnership Trends
Figure 3 shows partnership rates broken down by age group and by educational group. The
ﬁgure show how the timing of partnership formation diﬀer across educational groups. In the
early 20s, the low-educated are generally the most likely to have partners while the high-
educated are the least likely to have partners. In the age group 26-35, the partnership rates
of the medium- and high-educated have overtaken that of the low-educated. By the late 30s
and early 40s the high-educated the most likely to have partners. The ﬁgure also indicates a
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Figure 3: Partnership rates for women in the FRS 1995-2002 by age group.
It is diﬃcult to judge from the ﬁgures whether there is any support for the idea that in-
dividuals’ partnership decisions respond to beneﬁt incentives. Nevertheless, it is interesting to
13An potential issue is the degree of accuracy of the measurement of partnership status: Brewer and Shaw
(2006) highlight this by noting that the government seems to be paying out tax credits to more lone parents than
oﬃcial statistics suggest live in the UK. Partnership statu sh e r ei sb a s e do ns e l f - r e p o rted marital/cohabitation
status.
13consider what happens around the 1999 WFTC reform which, as noted above, seems to have
been generally favourable to partnership formation. Figure 3 suggests that the downward trends
in partnership rates may have been at least temporary broken.
IV The Empirical Framework
The aim is to model the partnership status of women, and in particular how the propensity to
have a partner is aﬀected by the beneﬁt consequences of having a partner. Partnership status
is treated as an individual choice. The elements of the model are as follows. Consider a set of
females I and let si denote the partnership status of female i ∈ I, si =0if she is single and
si =1if she has a partner. Each female i ∈ I has some individual characteristics denoted by
the vector xi ∈ X. The vector xi contains e.g. age, education, number of children, race, region
etc. (see below).
Each female is also associated with a (potential) partner with male characteristics zi ∈ Z.
The characteristics of the partner of interest are the ones that allow us to compute welfare
beneﬁts; this includes hours of work, earnings, age, number and ages of children. In the analysis
below I will assume that all men work (at least 16 hours/week), are above the age of 25 and
that all children always reside with the females.14 The remaining characteristic in zi is then
earnings (see below). With respect to partner identity I assume that there is a well-deﬁned
“marriage-market” equilibrium which features some degree of equilibrium sorting. Speciﬁcally,
female and male characteristics are not independent: (x,z) have some joint distribution which
I take as exogenously given.
I also allow for the possibility that a woman’s labour supply, and hence earnings, depends
on her partnership status. To formalize this, let each female i ∈ I be associated with two







i is the labour supply as
single and h1







containing female i’s earnings in the single and partnered state respectively.
Beneﬁt entitlement depends on partnership status, labour supply, earnings, individual char-
acteristics (e.g. number and ages of children), and the partner’s characteristics. Consider female
i.L e tBc





be the total beneﬁts that female i ∈ I and her partner are entitled
to as a couple; let B
f





be the beneﬁts that the female is entitled to as single
14Hence, in the empirical model, men are assumed to (i) not live as lone parents and (ii) not bring any children
into a relationship.
14and let Bm (zi) be the beneﬁts that her partner is entitled to as single. Given that all men
work at least 16 hours per week and that all children reside with the women the men will not
be entitled to any beneﬁts as single, Bm
i = Bm (zi)=0for all i ∈ I (except for Tax Credits
under the WTC). I further assume that a female, when with her partner, enjoys the full value
of the total beneﬁts obtained by the couple Bc
i. The net welfare beneﬁt partnership bonus for
female i can then be deﬁned as










− Bm (zi). (2)








i + β0xi if si =0
αBc
i + β1xi if si =1
. (3)
Female i will choose the partnered state if and only if u1
i ≥ u0
i. Taking the diﬀerence and
adding an stochastic utility component the utility diﬀerence can be written as
u1
i − u0
i = αBi + βxi + εi, (4)
where β ≡ β1 − β0 and where I used that Bm
i =0 .15 Assuming that the error term εi is
normally distributed the model can then be estimated as simple probit model (see Eissa and
Hoynes, 2003).
Imputing Partners and Labour Supplies
In order to characterize the partnership bonus Bi for female i we need to know, in addition to
the woman’s own characteristics xi, her (potential) partner’s characteristics zi and her potential
labour supplies and earnings, hi and yi. Two complications then immediately arise: (i) zi is
only observed for those women who actually have partners, and similarly, (ii) for each woman
only one of her two potential labour supplies is observed, not both (and the same goes for
earnings). Hence the unobserved values need to be imputed, i.e. we need to predict partners



















i as the beneﬁt incentives
for woman i for having a partner. The alternative choice of speciﬁcation has a negligible impact on the results.
15The justiﬁcation for assuming that each female is associated with two potential labour
supplies, one of which needs to be imputed, is two-fold: (i) to avoid bias, and, relatedly, (ii) to
ensure that identiﬁcation of the model comes from variation across groups and time, not from
within groups of similar women at a given point in time. The obvious alternative would be to
assume that the labour supply of each individual is ﬁxed across partnership states. Consider
then a certain group of women — low-educated mothers with one child, say — in any given
year. We know that, within this group, the single mothers work considerably less frequently
than their partnered comparables. Under the assumption of ﬁxed labour supplies, the single
mothers would then, on average, be facing higher IS partnership penalties (since they would,
as single, be entitled to IS more frequently). Hence if we were to use the assumption of ﬁxed
labour supplies, we would ﬁnd an “IS eﬀect” — IS partnership penalties would be found to
discourage partnership formation within the group of low-educated mothers of one child in the
speciﬁcy e a r .16 However, such an estimate would be strongly driven by the assumption of
ﬁxed labour supplies. A plausible assumption is that single and partnered women with the
same characteristics are “intrinsically identical”: had the currently single women had partners,
they would have worked as frequently as their partnered comparables. Conversely, had the
currently partnered women been single they would have had the same work patterns as their
single comparables. Similarly, had the currently single women had partners, their partners
would have been no diﬀerent from the partners of their partnered comparables. In that case
we should ﬁnd no eﬀects of beneﬁts within groups of women that share the same characteristics
and year. In short, since within any group and year, the single- and partnered women have the
same work-patterns across partnership states and have identical (potential) partners, they will
have identical distributions of partnership bonuses and penalties, thus implying zero correlation
between partnership status and partnership bonuses/penalties within that group/year. Stated
diﬀerently, it is assumed that partnership status is purely random within groups of women that
share the same characteristics and are observed at the same time.
In order to formalize the above assumptions and to impute labour supplies and partners I
adopt a simple “matching approach”. For woman i ∈ I let I1 (i) be the partnered women in the
sample who are “similar” to i; similarly, again for woman i ∈ I let I0 (i) be the single women
16On the other hand we would most likely ﬁnd, within the same group/year, a negative eﬀect of tax credit
partnership bonuses on the probability of having a partner since the single women would, under the assumption
of ﬁxed, labor supplies, have on average higher tax credit partnership bonuses.
16i nt h es a m p l ew h oa r e“ s i m i l a r ”t oi. (Below I describe what is the criterion for being deemed
as “similar”.) When imputing the counterfactual labour supply of a given woman i It h u su s e
as controls the set of similar women observed in the opposite partnership state. Similarly when
imputing partner characteristics for woman i I use as controls the set of similar women who are
currently partnered women. In fact, I predict partners for all women. One justiﬁcation for this
is that current earnings may reﬂect signiﬁcant temporary shocks; the predicted earnings can
then be thought of as a measure of the (predicted) partner’s permanent income.17
It remains to specify how we judge women to be “similar”. I use the standard Mahalanobis




0 V(xi − xj)
¤1/2 where V is the sample covariance matrix (Lee, 2005). A
number of covariates are, however, discrete. For these variables I insist on exact matching.
Moreover, I only match within years. Hence female j is deemed to be similar to female i if she
is observed in the same year, has the same value of the discrete characteristics, and the distance
(for the continuous variables) dij is no greater than some dmax (set equal to 2). The variables
on which I match include age, age left full time education, number of dependent children, a
parent dummy, living in a metropolitan area, and a set of regional dummies.18 The distribution
of matches is described in detail in Table 1.19
Predicting Partners
The male characteristic zi that needs to be predicted is earnings. I impute as partner earnings
for woman i ∈ I the average of the earnings of the partners in the set I1 (i). The assumption on
which the approach rests is that the partnership status is “purely random” for similar women.
Speciﬁcally, I assume:
Assumption 1. Conditional on the female characteristics x, partnership status s is independent
17Note that the FRS data is a repeated cross-section, not a panel. Hence it is not possible to estimate permanent
incomes using e.g. averaging across years.
18Region refers to “Government Oﬃce Region” and include North East, North West and Merseyside, Yorkshire
and Humber, East Midlands, West Midlands, Eastern, London, South East, South West, Wales, Scotland and
Northern Ireland.
19For single women we only need partnered controls (to impute counterfactual labour supply in the partnered
state and partners). For partnered women we need single controls to impact counterfactual labour supply and
partnered controls to impute partners. Thus, e.g. for partnered women we ﬁnd on average 77 “similar” single
women.
17of the partner’s characteristic z.
The assumption implies that the distribution of earnings among the (would-be) partners of
any woman with characteristics x is the same as the distribution of earnings among the actual







The assumption eﬀectively has two parts. First, it assumes that the observable female char-
acteristics x determine a woman’s “marriage market position” in the sense that they determine
the what pool of men they will draw their potential partners from. Second, it assumes that the
decision to form a partnership is depends on something else than the male characteristic, the
obvious candidate being random feelings of “love”.
Predicting State-Speciﬁc Labour Supplies
For each woman we observe only one of her two potential labour supplies: if she is single then
we observe h0
i while if she has a partner we observe h1
i. For simplicity I assume that women
respond to partnerships by adjusting labour supplies only on the extensive margin — i.e. I will
focus exclusively on the participation decision. Moreover, due to the key signiﬁcance of the 16
hours/week cut-oﬀ in both IS and Tax Credit programme I deﬁne “participation” as working
at least 16 hours/week. This restriction in focus is motivated by two observations: (i) for some
types of women x, the participation rate varies substantially with partnership status, but (ii)
conditional on any set of characteristics x and conditional on participating, the hours worked
vary relatively little with partnership status.
Figure 4 illustrates the ﬁrst statement by showing how the participation rates diﬀer for
single and partnered women within various subgroups of sample. It shows how the partnership-
eﬀect on participation is, for some subgroups and years, very large. Moreover the partnership-
eﬀect varies intricately with educational attainment and parental status. Note also that, in the
groups where substantial gaps exist, these gaps have diminished over time. The gap in hours
(conditional on participation) is, on the other hand, relatively small; I ﬁnd no group for whom
20By Assumption 1, there is, for each value of the female characteristics x, a distribution of partner earnings z
from which observed earnings are random draws. We thus assign as predicted partner earnings for female i the
expected value E [z|x = xi] which we estimate using matching.





































































































































































































































Figure 4: Participation rates (16hrs+) by partnership status among subgroups of women in the
sample.
Given the focus on the extensive margin let h0
i and h1
i be dummy variables indicating female
i’s participation status in the single and partnered state respectively. The participation status
in the actual state, denoted hi
i, is observed while the participation decision in the counterfactual
state, denoted h−i
i , is not. Hence I need to predict h−i
i for all i ∈ I.
The approach I use again rests on the assumption that partnership status be “purely ran-
dom” for women that share the same characteristics. Speciﬁcally, I assume:
21Deﬁning the hours gap (conditional on participation) as the average hours worked by single participating
women minus the average hours worked by partnered participating women, and pooling across years we have that
the gap is 3.1hrs (8.8 percent) for low-educated non-parents, 1 hr (2.7 percent) for medium-educated non-parents,
-0.2 hrs (0.5 percent) for high-educated non-parents, -2 hrs (6.6 percent) for low-educated parents, 0.8 hrs (2.6
percent) for low-educated parents, 2 hrs (5.8 percent) for low-educated parents.





This assumption implies that the would-be (partnered) participation rate of the currently
single women with characteristics x is the same as the actual participation rate of the currently
partnered women with the same characteristics (and vice versa).
The algorithm I use for imputing labour supplies in the counterfactual state ensures that
Assumption 2 holds on a set of basic characteristics x while respecting the observed labour
supplies to the largest extent possible. First I estimate individual participation probabilities









Second, I split the population by education (low, medium, and high), number of dependent
children (0,1,2+), and year and compute group-speciﬁc participation rates by partnership status
(a total of 180 means). Third, I assume that the participation decision of all women sharing
these same basic characteristics respond to partnership status in the same direction. E.g.
Figure 4 shows that single low educated non-parents work more frequently than their partnered
counterparts. Hence I assume that any partnered women in this group who is observed to be
working would continue to do so if she had been single; conversely, any single women observed
not to be working is assumed to also be not working as partnered. This assumption pins down a
counterfactual labour supply for the vast majority of women. Fourth, I draw, using the estimated
participation probabilities from the ﬁrst stage, a set of women whose participation decisions are
predicted to vary with partnership status. I continue to draw women until Assumption 2 holds
for all groups and years.
The distribution of actual- and predicted participation decisions is shown in Table 3. The
table shows that more than 90 percent of all single women are predicted not to vary their
labour force participation with partnership status. Slightly more than 6 percent of currently
single women who are observed not to be working are predicted to join the labour force as
partnered. Slightly less than 3 percent of the currently single women who are observed to
be working are predicted to leave the labour force if they became single. The results for the
partnered women are similar.
Identiﬁcation
Assumption 1 and 2 used in the imputations are crucial to the identiﬁcation strategy. The
assumptions state that, among a group of women sharing the same characteristics, single women
20and partnered women are intrinsically identical in terms of their (state-speciﬁc) labour supplies
and partners, and hence will have the same the distribution of partnership bonuses and penalties.
In order to verify this, consider the nine basic “types” of women (also used extensively below)
diﬀering in (i) educational attainment (low-, medium-, and high), and (ii) number of children
(0,1,2+). For each year and each basic demographic type consider then the correlation between
partnership status and net partnership bonus. With nine types, ten years and two policies (IS
and Tax Credits) I thus compute 180 correlations and ﬁnd no correlation to be statistically
signiﬁcant. Since I will also include type-dummies and year-dummies in the analysis below it
follows that the eﬀect of policy is identiﬁed from variation across groups and across time rather
from cross-sectional variation within groups. This also emphasizes the importance of having
policy reforms occurring within the time-frame of the analysis. As highlighted above, these
policy reforms aﬀected women of diﬀerent types in quite diﬀerent ways, thus allowing policy
eﬀects to be identiﬁed.
Further Issues
The current framework models the partnership status of women (single v. partnered) using
repeated cross-sectional data. That framework has a number of potential shortcomings. First,
as noted by Eissa and Hoynes (2003), it means that the model takes a “stock-approach” by
looking at states. An alternative would have been to adopt a “ﬂow-approach” by using panel
data and looking at transitions. In order for the stock-approach to be valid it has to be assumed
that all individuals eﬀectively optimize on a period-by-period basis. It is also implicitly assumed
that there are negligible search frictions in the “marriage market”.
A related issue is the treatment of children. Children are treated in the current model as
being eﬀectively exogenous. However, children may of course be endogenous to the partner-
ship status. E.g. a common modelling approach in dynamic modelling of family structure is
to assume that there is an exogenous probability of child-bearing that varies by partnership
state (see e.g. van der Klaauw (1996) and Brien, Lillard and Stern (2006)). Given the stock
approach, the endogeneity of children is a concern since children are also correlated with beneﬁt
entitlement. Hence if children were left out of the set of regressors there would be a potential
omitted variables bias.
A more complete model would thus take a dynamic approach with forward-looking individ-
uals, incorporating potential search frictions and endogenizing fertility. However, such models
21tend to be very complex and few panel data sets are rich enough for such models to be estimated
with any reasonable power. Hence in this case I choose to favour a simple stock approach in
order to exploit the “large numbers” advantage of the repeated cross-sectional data.
VR e s u l t s
Main Results
Consider ﬁrst the eﬀect of the total (IS + Tax Credits) partnership bonus on the probability of
having a partner. Table 4 (Column 1) presents the results from regressing partnership status,
si ∈ {0,1}, on the partnership bonus Bi (rescaled here as £100 per week), a set of demographic
variables, year dummies and regional dummies. In order to allow for unrestricted interactions
between education and number of children, I generate “type” dummies for the above nine basic
demographic groups by interacting educational group (low-, medium-, and high) with number
of children (0,1,2+). High educated mothers of 2+ children are left out as reference group.
Moreover, in order to allow partnership trends to vary across these demographic groups, I
interact the nine type dummies with time to generate nine “type-speciﬁc” additional linear
trends.
The results suggest that high-educated mothers of two+ children are the most likely to have
partners: all included type-dummies are negative and all are highly statistically signiﬁcant. The
eﬀect of education on the probability of having a partner varies with parental status: among
non-parents, there is no additional signiﬁcant eﬀect of education. On the other hand, for mothers
with one child, education is positively associated with having a partner. The same holds for
mothers with two or more children. There is also some evidence of type-speciﬁc trends.
Women living in metropolitan areas are less likely to have partners. The probability of having
a partner increases in age (at a diminishing rate) over nearly the entire age range considered;
moreover, the interaction between education and age is negative but small. In interpreting
the coeﬃcient on the number of children, it should be kept in mind that there are already
dummies for having 0 or 1 child. Hence the coeﬃcient is identiﬁed only from mothers of at least
two children; among this group more children are actually negatively associated with having a
partner. Mothers with young children are, on the other hand, more likely to have partners than
mothers with only older children. Blacks are, in the data, much less likely to have partners than
whites while Asians are slightly more likely to have partners.
22The results also suggest that women are more likely to have partners when there is beneﬁt
bonus from doing so. The coeﬃcient on the total beneﬁt partnership bonus suggests that a
total partnership bonus of £100/week increases the probability of having a partner by about 7
percentage points.
Recalling from Figure 2 that the overall average net (Tax Credit + IS) partnership bonus in
the population has been a fairly constant weekly penalty of just over £20 per week, the result
would suggest that the welfare beneﬁts have been reducing the aggregate partnership rate by
around one and a half percentage point. Below I also present calculations of the likely eﬀect of
the Tax Credit reforms.
Does it matter which beneﬁt generates the partnership bonus/penalty? There are reasons to
believe that it shouldn’t. The two beneﬁts share are least one important feature: they are both
time unlimited.22 Hence it is interesting to see whether IS and Tax Credits generate similar
responses. In Column 2 of Table 4 I present the results when IS and Tax Credits are included
separately. The results suggest that it doesn’t matter whether a partnership bonus/penalty is
generated by the IS programme or by the Tax Credits — the coeﬃcients are very similar. (As
we will see, this only holds for this full speciﬁcation.)
Table 5 reports on alternative speciﬁcations in order to examine the sensitivity of the ba-
sic result to the choice of control variables. Speciﬁcation 1 controls only for a parent dummy.
Adding controls for education (Low, Medium, or High) in Speciﬁcation 2 has little eﬀect on the
estimate. Speciﬁcation 3 adds year dummies to account for basic trends in the data. Speciﬁca-
tion 4 allows replaces the parent and education-type dummies with a ﬁner partition of the basic
demographic characteristics: it partitions the respondents into nine basic “types” by splitting
them according to whether they have 0,1 or 2+ children and interacting this with the educa-
tional group (see Table 4); the same speciﬁcation also allows for additional “type-speciﬁc” linear
trends. The main diﬀerence comes in Speciﬁcation 5 which controls for additional demograph-
ics, mainly age and the presence of young children. Age and the presence of young children
increases the probability of having a partner; both variables are also correlated with labour
supply and hence with beneﬁt entitlement. Omitting them therefore leads to a bias. Finally,
Speciﬁcation 6 reiterates the main speciﬁcation from Table 4.
22The only way to be “timed out” of either programme (at least during the years considered here) was due to
the children growing up. On the other hand, it should be pointed out that IS passports the recipient to a range
of other beneﬁts, including Housing Beneﬁt and Council Tax Beneﬁt.
23Beneﬁt Responses in Subgroups of the Population
It is quite possible that the beneﬁt responses diﬀer among subgroups of the population. E.g.
partnership rates were observed to vary across educational groups. Indeed, the ranking of
the groups also varied over the lifecycle; e.g. low educated women were the most likely to
have partners at low ages but the least likely to have partners in their late 30s and early
40s. Given that partnership patterns diﬀer across educational groups we might suspect that
the responsiveness to beneﬁt partnership bonuses and penalties might vary across educational
groups. Relatedly, since the value of beneﬁts relative to expected earnings, both own and
partner’s, will be smaller for individuals with more education we would expect to see the beneﬁt
response to decrease with education.
It is also natural to conjecture that women with children will be less responsive to the
incentives created by the welfare system. This could be because children raises the marginal
value of having access to the earnings of a partner or because having a male ﬁgure present in
the household is perceived to be beneﬁcial for the child’s development.
In order to explore these hypotheses I re-run the main regression within subgroups of the
population. The results are presented in Table 6. The table suggests that the responsiveness
of partnership status to the ﬁnancial incentives created by the beneﬁt system indeed decreases
with education, at least at higher levels.23 Parents and non-parents can best be compared on
the IS eﬀect since non-parents were not aﬀected by tax credits under FC and WFTC. For IS,
parents indeed respond less than non-parents. Tax credits only apply for non-parents under
WTC, but here the model does not pick up any tax credit eﬀect.
VI The Tax Credit Reforms
In this section I consider in some more detail the potential eﬀect of the recent Tax Credit reforms
on partnership rates. The family tax credits have, as shown above, in general an ambiguous
eﬀect on partnership incentives.
In order to explore the potential eﬀects of the Tax Credit reforms it is important to get
a handle on how exactly they aﬀected the distribution of partnership penalties and bonuses.
Figure 2 presented above provided some insights by showing how the distributions of Tax Credit
23This ﬁnding is in line with Eissa and Hoynes (2003) who ﬁnd that the marriage responsiveness to transfers
is lower among higher educated women.
24partnership bonuses and penalties have changed over time within the population. However, that
ﬁgure has three shortcomings for the current purposes. First, it contains only existing couples,
not single women. Second, the ﬁgure confounds the eﬀect of time-variation in policy with trends
in the distribution of demographic characteristics. Third, it assumes ﬁxed labour supplies, in
particular it doesn’t allow women’s labour supplies to vary with partnership status.
H e n c ew ew a n tt oc o n s i d e rh o wt h ed i s t r i b u t i o n of partnership bonuses and penalties has
varied due to policy changes while (i) looking at the entire population, including the single
women, (ii) holding the distribution of demographic characteristics ﬁxed, and (iii) allowing for
partnership state-speciﬁc labour supplies. To do this I take the population observed in one
speciﬁc year and expose them to the policies of all years while computing beneﬁt partnership
bonuses and penalties using the individually predicted partners and state-speciﬁc labour sup-
plies. Since the main interest is the Tax Credit reform it is appropriate to use the last cohort
observed before the start of the reforms. Hence I consider the 1998 cohort and expose this
particular cohort to the policies that were in place in each year from 1995 to 2004. The result
i ss h o w ni nF i g u r e5 ,s t r a t i ﬁed by education. For low educated women, Tax Credit partnership
bonuses are more common than penalties; for medium educated women bonuses and penal-
ties are equally common, while for high educated women partnership penalties are still more
common than bonuses.
Consider ﬁrst the 1999 WFTC reform. Figure 5 shows that that reform seems to have
slightly increased the fraction of low educated women who face tax credit partnership bonuses.
The reform is, however, more noticeable in the average bonuses and penalties.24 The ﬁgure
shows how the average tax credit partnership bonus increased sharply in all education groups.
At the same time the average partnership penalty also decreased slightly in all groups. The
WFTC reform hence seems to have been unambiguously favourable to partnership formation.
Indeed, looking at the aggregate population we see that the overall net Tax Credit partnership
bonus turned from being a small net penalty of just a few pounds per week under FC to a fairly
sizeable net partnership bonus of about £10 per week in 2001-2002.25
24Note that we assume that everyone is observed in each year in the same month that they were observed in
the 1998 survey. Hence for 1999 some individuals face the new WFTC system while some individuals face the
old FC system; the full eﬀect of the reform is visible from 2000 onwards.
25The reader may wonder why the fraction of couples subsidized increased gradually between 1999 and 2001
and not just as a single one oﬀ increase. The reason is two-fold. First, I assume that everyone is observed in
each year in the same month that they were observed in the 1998 survey. Hence for 1999 some individuals face
25The impact of the WTC/CTC reform, which extended credits to childless individual and
couples and consolidated the child premia provided under WFTC and IS into the uniﬁed CTC
programme, was very diﬀerent. That reform sharply increased the fraction of women facing
Tax Credit partnership penalties: this increase was largely due to the Tax Credits becoming
available to childless individuals and couples. It also sharply reduced the both the average
tax credit bonus and the average tax credit penalty. The eﬀect on the Tax Credits bonuses
and penalties of shifting of the child premia from IS to CTC should however be matched by a
corresponding change in the IS bonuses and penalties. This is indeed the case: in order to show
this, Figure 5 also includes the total (IS + Tax Credits) average net partnership bonus. This
shows that the transferring of the child premia from IS to CTC in 2004 had little eﬀect on the









































































































































































Figure 5: The distribution of Tax Credit partnership bonuses and penalties for a ﬁxed population
with state-speciﬁc labour supplies and predicted partners (2000 prices).
the new WFTC system while some individuals face the old FC system. Second, the Children’s Tax Credit was
introduced in 2001 (see Fn.9).
26Figure 5 thus highlights a curious pattern: while the WFTC reform seems to have been
quite favourable to partnership formation, most, if not all, of its potential positive eﬀect on
partnership incentives also seems to have been undone by the subsequent WTC/CTC reform.
In order to obtain an indication of the potential impact of welfare policy on partnership
rates, consider the WFTC reform. We can combine the impacts on the group-speciﬁca v e r a g e
net bonuses shown in Figure 5 with the group-speciﬁc estimated response rates presented in
Table 6. For low educated women the WFTC reform increased the average net Tax Credit
bonus by about £15 per week. This would imply an increased partnership rate in this group
of little over one percentage point. The corresponding ﬁgure for the medium educated women
would be around half a percentage point, while the response among high educated women would
be negligible. Hence, the model suggests that if the WFTC programme had been allowed to
continue it could potentially have increased the aggregate partnership rate by anything up to as
much as 0.7 percentage points. Of course, the WFTC version of the Tax Credits was abandoned
in favour of WTC/CTC which reversed the temporary improvement of partnership incentives.
The results on the potential programme eﬀects are comparable to Eissa and Hoynes (2003).
They explore the eﬀect of the EITC on marriage. They conclude that the EITC system increases
marriage rates among the lowest income households by about 1 percentage point while the eﬀect
is smaller as one moves up the income distribution.
VII Conclusions
The welfare system is commonly thought to aﬀect important dimensions of individuals behavior,
including when and how much to work, how much education to acquire, how much to save and
maybe even if and when to form partnerships and have children. However, little concrete
evidence on the eﬀect of beneﬁt systems on family structure is available for the UK. In this
paper I have considered the incentives generated by the system of Income Support (IS) and the
family Tax Credits (FC, WFTC, WTC/CTC) for partnership formation.
The empirical strategy used involved constructing, for each woman, the IS and Tax Credit
partnership “bonus” or “penalty” that she is likely to be facing and then estimating a model
where women’s partnership status depends on individual characteristics, year- and regional
eﬀect, and the constructed measure of the beneﬁt consequences of having a partner. This
empirical approach was motivated by the fact that Tax Credits in particular have an ambiguous
eﬀect on partnership incentives. Hence a standard diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence approach analyzing
27a particular reform may well fail to ﬁnd any signiﬁcant average treatment eﬀect even if there
are signiﬁcant responses that tend to cancel out. The current paper nevertheless obtains, in
diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence style, its identiﬁcation from variation across groups and across time. In
particular, the beneﬁtr e s p o n s ei si d e n t i ﬁe df r o mt h ef a c tt h a tr e c e n tr e f o r m sh a v ea ﬀected
diﬀerent groups in measurably diﬀerent ways and the model eﬀectively links this fact to the
observed changes in the group-speciﬁc partnership rates.
The results indicate that a £100/week partnership penalty reduces the probability that a
woman has a partner by about seven percentage points; moreover, the eﬀect was the same if
the beneﬁt in question was IS or Tax Credits. I also found that the responsiveness to beneﬁts
decreases with education and that parents are less responsive than non-parents.
Finally I considered, in light of the estimates, what eﬀect the recent Tax Credit reforms
may have had on partnership rates. I found that the WFTC reform noticeably strengthened
the beneﬁt incentives for having a partner (or, perhaps more accurately, reduced the beneﬁt
disincentives for having a partner). Indeed, it was found that that version of the tax credits
could potentially have increased the aggregate partnership rate by anything up to 0.7 percent-
age points. However, the subsequent WTC/CTC reform again deteriorated the partnership
incentives and undid most, if not all, of the potential impact of the WFTC reform.
28References
Baughman, R. & Dickert-Conlin, S. (2003), ‘Did expanding the eitc promote motherhood?’,
American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings 93, 247—251.
Bitler, M. P., Gelbach, J. B., Hoynes, H. W. & Zavodny, M. (2004), ‘The impact of welfare
reform on marriage and divorce’, Demography 41, 213—36.
Blundell, R. (2002), ‘Welfare-to-work: Which policies work and why?’, British Academy Pro-
ceedings 117, 477—524. Keynes Lecture in Economics.
Blundell, R., Duncan, A., McCrae, J. & Meghir, C. (2000), ‘The labour market impact of the
Working Families’ Tax Credit’, Fiscal Studies 21.
Blundell, R. & Hoynes, H. (2004), Has in-work beneﬁt reform helped the labour market?, in
D. Card, R. Blundell & R. Freeman, eds, ‘Seeking a Premier League Economy’, University
of Chicago Press, chapter 10, pp. 411—460.
Brewer, M., Duncan, A., Shephard, A. & Suarez, M. J. (2007), ‘Did Working Families’ Tax
Credit work? Analysing the impact of in-work support on labour supply and programme
participation’, Labour Economics 13, 699—720.
Brewer, M. & Shaw, J. (2006), ‘How many lone parents are receiving tax credits?’, Institute for
Fiscal Studies, Brieﬁng Note No. 70.
Brien, M. J., Lillard, L. A. & Stern, S. N. (2006), ‘Cohabitation, marriage and divorce in a
m o d e lo fm a t c h - q u a l i t y ’ ,International Economic Review 47, 451—494.
Dickert-Conlin, S. & Houser, S. (1999), ‘EITC, AFDC, and the female headship decision’.
Institute for Research on Poverty Discussion Paper no. 1192-99.
Eissa, N. & Hoynes, H. (2000), ‘Tax and transfer policy, and family formation: Marriage and
cohabitation’, Mimeo, University of California, Berkeley.
Eissa, N. & Hoynes, H. W. (2003), ‘Good news for low income families? Tax transfer schemes
and marriage’. Mimeo, University of California, Berkeley.
Ellwood, D. T. (2000), ‘The impact of the earned income tax credit and social policy reforms
on work, marriage, and living arrangements’, National Tax Journal 53, 1063—1106.
29Francesconi, M. & van der Klaauw, W. (2007), ‘The socioeconomic consequences of "in-work"
beneﬁt reform for British lone mothers’, Journal of Human Resources 42, 1—31.
Gregg, P. & Harkness, S. (2003), Welfare reform and lone parents employment in the UK, in
R. Dickens, P. Gregg & J. Wadsworth, eds, ‘The Labour Market Under Labour: State of
Working Britain 2003’, Palgrave.
Hotz, V. J. & Scholz, J. K. (2003), The earned income tax credit, in R. Moﬃt t ,e d . ,‘ M e a n s -
Tested Transfer Programs in the U.S.’, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, pp. 141—97.
Hoynes, H. W. (1997), ‘Does welfare play any role in female headship decisions?’, Journal of
Public Economics 65, 89—117.
Lee, M.-J. (2005), Micro-Econometrics for Policy, Program, and Treatment Eﬀects,O x f o r d
University Press.
Moﬃtt, R. (1992), ‘Incentive eﬀects of the U.S. welfare system: A review’, Journal of Economic
Literature 30, 1—61.
Moﬃtt, R. (1998), The eﬀect of welfare on marriage and the family, in R. Moﬃtt, ed., ‘Welfare
and Family and Reproductive Behavior’, National Academy Press, Washington D.C.
Rosenzweig, M. (1999), ‘Welfare, marital prospects, and nonmarital childbearing’, Journal of
Political Economy 107, S3—S22.
Schoeni, R. F. & Blank., R. M. (2000), ‘What has welfare reform accomplished? Impacts on
welfare participation, employment, income, poverty, and family structure’. NBER Working
Paper No. 7627.
Van der Klaauw, W. (1996), ‘Female labour supply and marital status decisions: A life-cycle
model’, Review of Economic Studies 63, 199—235.
Walker, I. & Zhu, Y. (2006), ‘Child support and partnership dissolution’, Economic Journal
106, C93—C116.
30Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Variable Women with Partners Women without Partners
(Std. Err.) (Std. Err.)
Age 38.42 34.51
(8.99) (9.95)
Age left FT education 17.41 17.41
(2.52) (2.60)
Number dep. children 1.13 .79
(1.14) (1.08)
No. children aged 0-4 .33 .20
(.62) (.49)
No. children aged 5-10 .39 .30
(.69) (.61)
No. children aged 11-15 .30 .23
(.60) (.54)
No. children aged 16-18 .10 .06
(.33) (.26)
Weekly earnings 56.99 64.10
(65.72) (74.63)










Partner weekly earnings † 160.32
(136.14)
Predicted partner earnings 161.07 158.67
(24.37) (26.46)
Continued on next page...
31... table 1 continued
Variable Women with Partners Women without Partners
(Std. Err.) (Std. Err.)
Observations 81,554 35,461
† Average for employed partners.
Table 2: Distribution of matches for partnered and single
women.
Target Group Partnered Partnered Single
Control Group Single Partnered Partnered
10th Percentile 21 52 49
Median 71 154 157
Mean 77.3 163.8 176.1
90th Percentile 147 287 326




i =1and b h1
i =1 24,158 68.13
h0
i =0and b h1
i =0 8,020 22.62
h0
i =0and b h1
i =1 2,263 6.38
h0
i =1and b h1




i =1and b h0
i =1 50,754 62.23
h1
i =0and b h0
i =0 22,695 27.83
h1
i =0and b h0
i =1 2,189 2.68
h1
i =1and b h0
i =0 5,916 7.25
33Table 4: Estimates of a probit model of partnership status
Variable Marg. Eﬀ.M a r g . E ﬀ.
(Std. Err.) (Std. Err.)
Partnership Bonus: Total Beneﬁts 0.077
(0.007)∗∗
Partnership Bonus: Income Support 0.076
(0.010)∗∗
Partnership Bonus: Tax Credits 0.076
(0.007)∗∗
Low-education, zero child -0.419 -0.419
(0.024)∗∗ (0.024)∗∗
Medium-education, zero child -0.447 -0.447
(0.023)∗∗ (0.023)∗∗
High-education, zero child -0.466 -0.466
(0.023)∗∗ (0.023)∗∗
Low-education, one child -0.335 -0.335
(0.024)∗∗ (0.024)∗∗
Medium-education, one child -0.259 -0.259
(0.027)∗∗ (0.027)∗∗
High-education, one child -0.173 -0.173
(0.032)∗∗ (0.032)∗∗
Low-education, two+ child -0.222 -0.222
(0.023)∗∗ (0.023)∗∗
Medium-education, two+ child -0.087 -0.087
(0.024)∗∗ (0.024)∗∗
Trend: Low-ed, zero child -0.003 -0.003
(0.001)∗∗ (0.001)∗∗
Trend: Medium-ed, zero child -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
Trend: High-ed, zero child 0.004 0.004
(0.002)∗∗ (0.002)∗∗
Trend: Low-ed, one child -0.010 -0.010
(0.001)∗∗ (0.001)∗∗
Continued on next page...
34... table 4 continued
Variable Marg. Eﬀ.M a r g . E ﬀ.
(Std. Err.) (Std. Err.)
Trend: Medium-ed, one child -0.006 -0.006
(0.002)∗∗ (0.002)∗∗
Trend: High-ed, one child -0.001 -0.001
(0.003) (0.003)
Trend: Low-ed, two+ child -0.008 -0.008
(0.001)∗∗ (0.001)∗∗
Trend: Medium-ed, two+ child -0.006 -0.006
(0.002)∗∗ (0.002)∗∗
Trend: High-ed, two+ child -0.001 -0.001
(0.003) (0.003)




Age squared -0.0005 -0.0005
(0.0000)∗∗ (0.0000)∗∗
Age * Age left FT educ. -0.0001 -0.0001
(0.0000)∗∗ (0.0000)∗∗
Number of dep. children -0.043 -0.043
(0.003)∗∗ (0.004)∗∗







Signiﬁcance levels: ∗ :5 % ∗∗ :1 %
Remark: Explanatory variables not shown are year dummies and regional dummies.
35Table 5: Estimates of a probit model of partnership status:
Alternative speciﬁcations
Speciﬁcation Net IS Bonus Net Tax Credit Bonus
(Std. Err.) (Std. Err.)
Speciﬁcation 1: 0.043 0.032
Parent dummy (0.008)∗∗ (0.006)∗∗
Speciﬁcation 2: 0.035 0.029
Parent dummy, Ed grp (low, medium, high) (0.008)∗∗ (0.006)∗∗
Speciﬁcation 3: 0.053 0.041
As 2 plus year dummies (0.008)∗∗ (0.006)∗∗
Speciﬁcation 4: 0.045 0.037
Type dummies and Type-spec. trends (0.009)∗∗ (0.007)∗∗
Speciﬁcation 5: 0.090 0.083
As Spec 5 plus more demographics (0.009)∗∗ (0.007)∗∗
Speciﬁcation 6: 0.076 0.076
As Spec 6 plus region and metro (0.010)∗∗ (0.007)∗∗
Signiﬁcance levels: ∗ :5 % ∗∗ :1 %
36Table 6: Estimates of a probit model of partnership status:
Subgroups of the population.
Subgroup IS Bonus Tax Credit Bonus Observations
(Std. Err.) (Std. Err.)
Low Educations 0.074 0.097 61,815
(0.012)∗∗ (0.009)∗∗
Medium Education 0.092 0.075 33,553
(0.021)∗∗ (0.015)∗∗
High Education 0.052 0.018 21,647
(0.025)∗ (0.018)
Parents 0.043 0.057 64,771
(0.012)∗∗ (0.008)∗∗
Non-Parents 0.109 -0.006 52,244
(0.015)∗∗ 0.031
Signiﬁcance levels: ∗ :5 % ∗∗ :1 %
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